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Abstract 
Credence goods, such as car repairs or medical services, are characterized by severe 
informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers, leading to fraud in the form of 
provision of insufficient service (undertreatment), provision of unnecessary service 
(overtreatment) and charging too much for a given service (overcharging). Recent 
experimental research involving a standard (student) subject pool has examined the influence 
of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud. We investigate whether 
professional car mechanics – as real sellers of credence goods – react in the same way to 
changes in informational and institutional constraints. While we find qualitatively similar 
effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools, car 
mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions, 
which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training. 
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1. Introduction 
Credence goods are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and 
consumers on the quality of service that yields the highest surplus from trade: While sellers 
learn that quality by performing a diagnosis, consumers are unable to judge which quality is 
the surplus maximizing one. Moreover, in many cases consumers are not even ex post able to 
observe the received quality. The seminal paper on credence goods is by Darby and Karni 
(1973), who added this type of good to Nelson (1970)’s classification of ordinary, search and 
experience goods. Typical examples of credence goods are car repairs, medical services, 
software programming, or taxi rides in an unfamiliar city. Hence, despite of the uncommon 
name, credence goods are frequently consumed and economically important.  
The informational asymmetries prevalent in markets for credence goods invite 
fraudulent behavior by sellers, implying that the search for institutions that increase efficiency 
on credence goods markets is a highly relevant topic in economics (see Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer, 2006, for a survey of the literature). In particular, credence goods markets 
typically suffer from the following types of cheating on consumers: (1) undertreatment, i.e., 
providing a quality that is insufficient to satisfy the consumer’s needs; (2) overtreatment, i.e., 
choosing a higher quality than the surplus maximizing one; and (3) overcharging, i.e., 
charging for a higher quality than has been provided.  
That fraud is more than mere a theoretical possibility in markets for credence goods has 
been documented, among others, by Domenighetti et al. (1993). The authors examine how 
patients’ information affects the treatment they receive in hospitals and find that common 
surgical procedures are less frequent for patients perceived as being better informed. In a 
similar vein, Gruber and Owings (1996) show that the relative frequency of cesarean 
deliveries responds to the remuneration for it. While these and other field studies impressively 
document the existence of fraud, a general disadvantage of field data is the lack of controlled 
variation of factors predicted to be crucial by theory. Controlled variation is the key advantage 
of the laboratory. In the context of credence goods lab experiments have recently been 
conducted by Kerschbamer et al. (2009) and Dulleck et al. (2011). Those studies examine the 
influence of informational and market conditions on the type and extent of fraud, finding, 
among others, that liability clauses (preventing undertreatment) are key for the efficient 
provision of credence goods, whereas verifiability (preventing overcharging) fails to improve 
efficiency, although in theory it should. While providing important information on the impact 
of institutions on market outcomes, the experimental studies by Kerschbamer et al. (2009) and 
Dulleck et al. (2011) leave one important question unanswered: Do real world sellers of 
credence goods react in the same way to changes in the informational and institutional 
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framework as university students do? This question touches on the issue of external validity 
of laboratory data. 
In principle, there are two ways to address this question. The first one is to study the 
behavior of professionals in field experiments. Schneider (2012) and Balafoutas et al. (2013) 
are examples for this approach. Schneider (2012) brought his car for repair to different 
garages, sometimes suggesting the potential for repeated interaction in the future, sometimes 
inducing the impression that repeated interaction was highly unlikely. Based on data from 91 
undercover garage visits, the author finds no evidence that a mechanic’s concerns for 
reputation have an influence on the service provided; however it has an impact on diagnosis 
fees. Balafoutas et al. (2013) have studied the impact of perceived information on the type and 
extend of fraudulent behavior of taxi drivers. Based on the data from more than 300 
undercover taxi rides, the authors find that taxi drivers exploit their informational advantage 
in a systematic way by taking passengers perceived as uninformed about the city on longer 
detours and charging unjustified surcharges to passengers perceived as uninformed about the 
tariff system. 
While these field studies provide compelling evidence about the problems prevalent in 
credence goods markets, they do not directly address the question of external validity of 
results based on lab data generated with a university student subject pool. In particular, it is 
often argued that students are different from non-students in many respects and that those 
differences might translate to different behavior. So, for judging the external validity of 
student data one way is to compare the behavior of students to that of real professionals in the 
same environment. This is the way the issue of external validity is addressed in the current 
paper. 1  Specifically, we ask the question whether one would reach similar conclusions 
regarding the impact of informational and institutional constraints on the behavior on markets 
for credence goods by taking professionals from the target field of interest –the market for car 
repairs in the present case– as participants in lab experiments. In addition, we are also 
interested in quantitative differences across subject pools for a given institutional framework, 
but only to the extent that those differences have economically relevant implications for 
optimal institutional design. Addressing those issues seems important because the ultimate 
goal of lab experiments in the context of credence goods is to complement theoretical work in 
search for institutions that help to contain the amount of fraud in real world credence goods 
markets and because in the end experts –and not students– make the key decisions in such 
markets.  
                                                 
1
 A related external validity issue is that the lab is an artificial environment and as such might miss some 
behaviorally relevant features of the field. This dimension of external validity is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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To address those issues we let 96 car mechanics take decisions as sellers in an 
experimental credence goods game and compare their behavior to that of 140 university 
students in the role of sellers. We find that car mechanics react qualitatively very similar to 
changes in the informational and institutional framework as students do. Regarding 
quantitative differences across subjective pools within a given informational and institutional 
framework our most important finding is that car mechanics have a more pronounced 
tendency to supply unnecessary services in each institutional framework. We argue that this 
difference in behavior is probably due to decision heuristics car mechanics learned in their 
professional training. 
Several studies have compared the behavior of professionals and students in other 
environments. Many of them find that professionals’ behavior is qualitatively similar to that 
of students. Examples include Siegel and Harnett (1964) who compare the behavior of 
students and employees in the industrial sale operation division of General Electric in a 
bargaining game and find that the two subject pools behave largely similar; Dyer et al. (1989) 
who compare the behavior of students to that of executives from construction companies in 
common value auctions and find that both exhibit the winner’s curse and share also other 
relevant patterns; Cooper et al. (1999), who compare the behavior of students and managers in 
a market entry game, finding similar core behavior; and Potters and van Winden (2000) who 
compare the behavior of students and public relationship officers in a lobbying game and only 
find minor difference.2 Those studies finding differences in behavior across professionals and 
students largely attribute them to decision rules, abilities, preferences, or information that 
professionals have acquired during their career. Burns (1985), for instance, attributes the 
difference in behavior between experienced wool buyers and students in a progressive oral 
auction to the decision rules the former have acquired in the market they know; Fehr and List 
(2004) report CEOs to be more trusting and more trustworthy in an experimental trust game 
than students are, arguing that CEOs have experienced more often the possible efficiency 
gains from trust and trustworthiness; Alevy et al. (2007) attribute the difference in behavior 
between market professionals from the floor of the Chicago Board of Trade and students in an 
experimental information cascade game to the fact that the former use a more sophisticated 
decision process and are better able to discern the quality of public signals; and Carpenter and 
                                                 
2
 The impression that the majority of studies comparing the behavior of students and experts in standard lab 
experiments find qualitatively similar patterns is confirmed by Fréchette (2013). The author reviews 13 such 
studies and concludes (on page 33) that “[i]n 9 of those 13, professionals are not closer or further from the theory 
in a way that would lead us to draw different conclusions.” See Ball and Cech (1996) for a broader survey on 
subject pool differences in general, and Camerer (2013) for an even broader discussion on external validity of 
lab experiments. Al-Ubaydli and List (2013) propose a theoretical model that helps frame the crucial features in 
the debate on lab-field generalizability. 
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Seki (2011) compare the behavior of shrimp fishermen organized in a group that shares both 
income and operating expenses to that of students in a voluntary contribution game and 
attribute the finding that the former contribute significantly more to endogenously acquired 
social preferences. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of a 
credence goods market. Section 3 presents the experimental procedure and Section 4 the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Credence Goods Model 
Consider the following credence goods game, henceforth referred to as condition B (for 
baseline). It is a simplified and parameterized version of a game studied by Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer (2006) and it corresponds to condition B/N in Dulleck et al. (2011). There are 
two players, an expert seller and a customer. First, the expert posts two prices: PL for a low 
quality service and PH for a high quality service, where PL, PH ∈{1, 2, …, 11} and PL ≤ PH. 
The customer gets to know these prices and then decides whether to stay out of the market or 
to interact with the expert. If the customer stays out, the game ends and both parties receive an 
outside option of 1.6 points. If the customer decides to interact with the expert, nature assigns 
with equal probability the need for the low and the need for the high quality service. The 
expert learns the customer’s need and provides either the low (qL) or the high (qH) quality, 
where the low (or high) quality has costs of cL = 2 (cH = 6, respectively) points. Finally, the 
expert charges one of the posted prices: PL if he claims to have provided the low quality, and 
PH otherwise. The customer receives a value of 10 points from the interaction if she receives a 
sufficient quality (i.e., if she needs the low quality and gets either the low or the high quality, 
or if she needs the high quality and gets it), otherwise she receives a value of zero. Whether or 
not the customer’s need is satisfied, she must pay the price of the quality the expert claims to 
have provided. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of moves in this game and the material 
payoffs of each player. 
In real credence goods markets various informational and institutional conditions might 
limit a seller’s fraudulent behavior. We consider two alternatives to our baseline condition, 
both limiting a seller’s strategy space (in comparison to condition B): (1) liability (condition 
L), requiring that the seller provides a sufficient quality, and (2) verifiability (condition V), 
requiring that the seller charges the price for the quality of service rendered. Thus, liability 
precludes undertreatment, and verifiability precludes overcharging. Note that liability does 
not preclude overcharging, whereas verifiability does not prohibit undertreatment. Neither of 
them prevents overtreatment. 
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Figure 1: Game Tree 
 
Assuming common knowledge that all players are rational and only interested in own material 
payoffs the three games can be solved via backward-induction. In condition B, an own-money 
maximizing expert always provides the low quality and charges for the high one. Anticipating 
this, the customer only enters if PH ≤ 3. But with such a PH an expert is unable to earn the 
value of the outside option. Thus, the market breaks down. In condition L, an own-money 
maximizing expert always provides the appropriate quality and charges PH. Anticipating this, 
the consumer accepts if PH ≤ 8. Thus, the expert posts PH = 8 (PL is indeterminate) and the 
customer enters the market. In condition V, the own-money maximizing expert always 
chooses (and charges for) the quality with the higher mark-up (defined as the difference 
between price and cost) and is willing to choose the appropriate quality if markups are the 
same for both qualities. Since consumers correctly anticipate this, the expert cannot gain by 
cheating. Thus, the expert posts the most profitable equal-markup price vector that is accepted 
– which is the vector (PL, PH) = (6, 10) – and the customer enters the market. Table 3 in the 
Appendix summarizes those benchmark predictions.  
 
3. Experimental Procedure 
We recruited car mechanics in their third or fourth year of professional training from the 
“Tiroler Fachberufsschule für Kraftfahrzeugtechnik”, a vocational school located in Innsbruck, 
Austria. These mechanics are apprentices and work as regular employees at their respective 
auto repair shops. We use them as experts in our experiment. Students at the University of 
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Innsbruck acted as customers. The experiment was conducted with our mobile lab at the 
vocational school. In total, 96 car mechanics acted as sellers and 96 undergraduate students 
acted as customers in the computerized experiment using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the 
start of each session, we informed all subjects that there are two roles in the experiment and 
that car mechanics would exclusively act in one role and students would exclusively act in the 
other. Then the game was explained to subjects. Given that car mechanics have less education 
and therefore may have difficulties in understanding the experimental procedure, we took 
great care to make sure they fully understood the game. We used an intuitive graph to 
illustrate the sequence of decisions to car mechanics (see Figure 2 in the Appendix). We 
walked car mechanics through the games slowly and explained to them the implications of 
each possible choice. Also, all subjects had to answer a set of control questions individually, 
and the experiment proceeded only after all control questions had been answered correctly. 
We had 3 conditions in the experiment: the baseline condition (condition B), the liability 
condition (condition L), and the verifiability condition (condition V). For each condition, we 
ran 2 sessions with 32 subjects each (16 car mechanics and 16 students). Within a session, we 
formed independent matching groups of four car mechanics and four students, with random 
re-matching of one car mechanic and one student after each round within each matching 
group. The stage game was played 16 rounds, and earnings were accumulated across all 
rounds. The exchange rate between experimental points and euros was 0.25 euro per point, 
and participants earned about 13 euros in less than 90 minutes. 
As a comparison to these sessions with car mechanics as experimental sellers of 
credence goods, we use a subset of the data presented in Dulleck et al. (2011). A few months 
prior to our experiment with car mechanics, they ran an experiment with an almost identical 
procedure and the same monetary incentives, using a subject pool consisting of 280 university 
students, 140 of which were in the role of sellers.3   
 
4. Experimental Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all experimental treatments, where B, L and V 
indicate the three experimental conditions introduced above, and subscripts C and S refer to 
                                                 
3
 There are three differences in the experimental design between Dulleck et al. (2011) and the present study: (1) 
In the present study all car mechanics were assigned to the role of experts and all students were assigned to the 
role of consumers, while in Dulleck et al. roles were assigned randomly. (2) In the present study students 
received an extra show-up fee of 5 Euros to compensate for the additional traveling time; the variable part of 
subjects’ earnings was exactly the same as in Dulleck et al. (2011). (3) In the present study the sequence of 
decisions in the stage game was additionally illustrated by displaying the “decision tree” in Figure 2 while in 
Dulleck et al. (2011) the instructions were purely verbal. 
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car mechanics and students in the role of sellers.4 Interaction is calculated as the proportion of 
cases where customers agree to interact. Efficiency is calculated as the ratio of the actual 
average profit and the maximum possible average profit per period (adjusted by subtracting 
the outside option from the nominator and denominator). Undertreatment (overtreatment) is 
calculated as the relative frequency with which the expert provides the low (high) quality 
when the customer needs the high (low) one. In order to make overcharging comparable 
between conditions B and L, we follow Dulleck et al. (2011) in defining overcharging as 
satisfying the following conditions: (i) PH > PL, (ii) the customer needs the low quality, and 
(iii) the expert provides the low quality, but charges for the high one. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
car mechanics 
 
students# 
 
BC LC VC  BS LS VS 
PL 4.79 5.81 5.61** 
 
4.95 5.98 6.03 
PH 7.47 8.22 8.06* 
 
7.63 8.14 7.76 
interaction 0.50 0.67*** 0.50 
 
0.45 0.82 0.50 
efficiency 0.11 0.62*** 0.13 
 
0.18 0.84 0.16 
undertreatment 0.61 n/a 0.49* 
 
0.53 n/a 0.60 
overtreatment 0.20*** 0.11** 0.25*** 
 
0.06 0.02 0.05 
overcharging 0.72 0.67 n/a 
 
0.88 0.75 n/a 
number of subjects 64 64 64 
 
96 96 88 
***
 / ** / * difference between subject pools significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level according to two-sided 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test using group averages as the unit of observation 
#
 data taken from Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2011). 
 
Result 1. Regardless of whether experts are car mechanics or students, (i) markets 
under condition B perform better than standard theory predicts, (ii) markets under condition 
V perform worse than standard theory predicts, and (iii) imposing L has a large and 
significant effect on interaction rates and efficiency, while imposing V does not. 
Support for R1 (i): The interaction ratio is 0.50 in BC, respectively 0.45 in BS, which is 
in sharp contrast to the theoretical prediction of no interaction, but is consistent with existing 
empirical evidence of the functioning of actual car repair markets (c.f. Schneider 2012, for 
instance). Actual undertreatment and overcharging ratios are significantly below the predicted 
level of 100%, which increases incentives for customers to enter the market. However, 
customers are, in general, too credulous as they enter the market although it does not pay to 
do so in the aggregate. Nevertheless, efficiency levels are clearly above the theoretical 
prediction of zero with both subject pools. Dulleck et al. (2011) discuss social or moral norms 
                                                 
4
 Throughout the market conditions B, L and V are called ‘conditions’, while a market condition combined with 
a subject pool is called a ‘treatment’. 
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and non-trivial distributional preferences as possible explanations. Kerschbamer et al. (2009) 
explore the latter hypothesis more systematically and provide supporting evidence for that 
explanation.   
Support for R1 (ii) and (iii): The benchmark solution (displayed in Table 3 in the 
Appendix) suggests that both liability and verifiability should increase interaction rates and 
efficiency up to 100%. However, only liability, but not verifiability, increases the interaction 
rate and efficiency significantly in comparison to condition B, controlling for the subject pool. 
More precisely, interaction rates are significantly increased in condition L (p < 0.01 for BS vs. 
LS and p < 0.05 for BC vs. LC), but not in condition V (p > 0.33 for BS vs. VS and p > 0.91 for 
BC vs. VC). Efficiency is significantly increased in condition L (p < 0.01 for BS vs. LS and p < 
0.01for BC vs. LC), but not in condition V (p > 0.53 for BS vs. VS and p > 0.64for BC vs. VC).5 
The insignificant effect of verifiability on interaction – compared to condition B – is driven by 
two factors. First, the prediction for V is based on expert sellers posting equal-markup vectors 
(i.e., price-vectors with PH - cH = PL - cL). Such vectors are very rarely chosen in VC (13%) 
and in VS (4%), though. Second, the benchmark solution assumes that experts provide the 
appropriate quality under equal-markup price-vectors. However, experts frequently over- or 
undertreat even under such vectors: Students provide an inappropriate quality in 17% of the 
cases under equal-markup vectors, while car mechanics do so in 42% of the cases. 
Comparing the behavior of the two subject pools within a given condition our most 
remarkable finding is an economically important and statistically significant difference in 
overtreatment rates in all conditions:  
Result 2. Regardless of the informational and institutional conditions under which 
transactions take place, car mechanics provide overtreatment much more often than student 
experts. 
Support for R2: In all conditions, car mechanics provide the high quality when the low 
one is needed significantly more often than students (p < 0.05). Notice that under conditions 
B and L, overtreatment causes unnecessary costs for the expert without any compensating 
benefit.  Thus, it is pure waste at an own material cost in these conditions. Only in condition V 
overtreatment can be profitable for sellers; specifically it is profitable if they have posted 
overtreatment price-vectors (i.e., price-vectors with PH - cH > PL - cL).  In treatment VS we 
observe such price-vectors in only 2% of all cases, while we observe them in 13% of cases in 
treatment VC. Thus, in condition V the higher frequency of overtreatment by car mechanics 
                                                 
5
 All tests are two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests using group averages as the unit of observation. Group here 
refers to an independent matching group consisting of 4 sellers and 4 consumes. 
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can (at least partly) be explained by their price-posting behavior. In Table 1 the difference in 
price-posting behavior in condition V manifests itself in the price spread between high and 
low quality, which is larger, on average, for car mechanics. The difference in price-posting 
behavior between VC and VS might also be responsible for another (weakly significant) 
difference in behavior in condition V: Car mechanics provide the low quality when the high 
quality is needed in 49% of the relevant cases, while students do so in 60% of the cases. 
While the difference between subject pools in posted prices can at least partly explain the 
difference in under- and overtreatment frequencies between subject pools in condition V it 
cannot explain the high overtreatment frequency of car mechanics in the other two conditions. 
Table 1 reveals another difference in the behavior of the two subject pools: The interaction 
rate is significantly lower in LC than in LS. This is surprising as with liability consumers do 
not have to worry about undertreatment and because the posted prices are quite similar in the 
two treatments. A possible explanation for this finding is that the higher overtreatment 
frequency in LC as compared to LS drives consumers out of the market. A direct consequence 
of the higher overtreatment rate and the lower interaction rate in LC is that efficiency is lower 
in LC than in LS.  
Returning to overtreatment, we ran a Probit regression with random effects on 
individual subjects for each condition to examine the phenomenon more carefully. The 
dependent variable is the probability of overtreatment. As independent variables we use PL, 
PH, period, and a dummy variable indicating whether the expert was a car mechanics. The 
results of these regressions are reported in Table 2. As expected from the non-parametric tests, 
the car mechanics dummy is positive and highly significant (at the 1%-level) in each 
condition, confirming that car mechanics are more prone to provide overtreatment than 
students. Also, in all conditions overtreatment decreases in PL and this effect is particularly 
pronounced in condition V. In this latter condition overtreatment also strongly increases in PH. 
 
For condition V those price effects are perfectly in line with the material incentives the sellers face, 
while in conditions B and L they are only in line with the material incentives if seller intend to charge 
the price for the quality provided (which some seller do, but not many; this might explain why the 
price effects are much weaker in conditions B and L than in V). Finally, the negative coefficient of 
the variable period indicates that overtreatment decreases over time. This pattern is confirmed 
by Figure 3 (in the Appendix), which shows the development of the overtreatment ratio over 
the last 10 periods in the six treatments. Overtreatment ratios of car mechanics start much 
higher and remain much higher – despite falling over time – than those of student sellers. 
 
Table 2: A Random Effects Probit Regression 
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dependent variable overtreatment 
market condition B L V 
PL -0.144* (0.081) 
-0.121* 
(0.065) 
-0.545*** 
(0.102) 
PH 0.0541 (0.073) 
-0.142 
(0.100) 
0.484*** 
(0.117) 
period -0.080*** (0.026) 
-0.077*** 
(0.026) 
-0.067** 
(0.028) 
car mechanic 0.699*** (0.260) 
0.697*** 
(0.238) 
0.912*** 
(0.284) 
constant -0.837* (0.475) 
0.275 
(0.749) 
-2.085** 
(0.863) 
observations 301 502 299 
prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively 
Note: Random effects are on the level of the individual subject. Interaction terms were dropped 
due to their insignificance and the improvement in model fit (Bayesian information criterion). 
 
Turning to possible explanations for our results, students differ from car mechanics in many 
dimensions including family background, wealth, education, etc. and each of these differences 
could potentially be responsible for the differences in behavior we observe. If they are, then 
our findings are not primarily due to the fact that one group is composed of professionals in 
the field of interest while the other is composed of students. However, with most of the 
mentioned factors it seems unlikely that they directly drive our findings. More likely, car 
mechanics’ professional training, routines, and norms induce them to use decision heuristics 
different from those of students. In the current experiment, car mechanics are introduced to 
the new, unfamiliar environment of an economic experiment. When facing such an 
environment it seems plausible that car mechanics rely on decision heuristics for similar 
situations experienced in the field. In that sense, the tendency of car mechanics to overtreat 
seems to be consistent with the incentives they face in everyday life. In the car repairing 
business undertreatment often implies serious consequences, either due to institutional 
constraints or the car mechanic’s concern for his reputation. Overtreatment, on the other hand, 
is difficult to detect and to punish. This might yield strong incentives in the car repair business 
to provide higher quality than warranted. And there is indeed evidence suggesting that these 
incentives translate in behavior. For instance, the US Department of Transportation estimated 
that more than half of the expenses for car repairs are unnecessary, thus constituting 
overtreatment (Wolinsky, 1993). It seems reasonable that our car mechanics have been 
repeatedly exposed in their professional career to this kind of incentives for overprovision, 
making them more prone to providing unnecessary services also in our experiment.  
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5. Conclusion 
We have compared the behavior of university students and car mechanics as sellers in an 
experimental credence goods market. Our results have shown that both subject pools react 
qualitatively in the same way to changes in the informational and institutional framework. 
Specifically, we have found that liability – but not verifiability – has a strong effect on the 
likelihood of interaction and overall market efficiency. Thus, the main results of previous 
experimental studies (by Kerschbamer et al., 2009, and Dulleck et al., 2011) on the effects of 
institutional safeguards on credence goods markets are robust against a change in subject pool 
from university students to real experts. Regarding differences in behavior across subject 
pools within a given market condition we have found an economically important and 
statistically significant difference in the propensity to provide too high quality (like 
unnecessary repairs). Specifically, car mechanics have chosen overtreatment significantly 
more often than university students in all conditions. In line with previous literature (see, e.g. 
Burns, 1985; Alevy, et al., 2007), we have argued that this difference is most likely due to 
particular decision rules that professionals – car mechanics in our case – have developed in 
the past. Since in the car repairing business – as in many other credence goods markets – 
undertreatment is typically observable and verifiable while overtreatment is not, and since in 
real life a diagnosis is typically subject to errors, real experts often face strong incentives for 
providing “safe solutions”. Seen from that perspective, the tendency of car mechanics to 
overtreat in an experimental market for credence goods seems to be consistent with the 
incentives they face in their everyday professional life. 
We view our findings as potentially having important implications for the design of 
institutions for credence goods markets: Previous experimental results (by Kerschbamer et al., 
2009; Dulleck et al., 2011, or Beck et al., 2013, for instance) have suggested that 
overtreatment is hardly an issue in such markets while common sense suggests that it is an 
important phenomenon in real credence goods markets. If the findings reported here are 
confirmed in future research then they suggest that imposing liability alone is insufficient to 
contain fraud in markets for credence goods and this insight might then stipulate further 
theoretical work on the design of better institutions. Besides providing important substantive 
information on behavior in markets for credence goods, the present work (together with 
Dulleck et al. 2011) also offers a methodological contribution in suggesting the 
complementary role of experiments with students (which can easily be conducted on a large 
scale) and those with professionals (where the scale of the experiment is typically limited).  
Investigating how professionals make decisions in stylized mini-games in the lab 
touches only one dimension of external validity, of course. A related issue concerns the 
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artificial environment in the lab, which also merits serious consideration. In that respect our 
work presents only a first step and more work is needed to bridge the gap between the lab and 
the naturally-occurring setting of interest, before conclusions can be drawn for the optimal 
design of institutions for markets for credence goods. 
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Figure 2: Example Slide Used in Car Mechanic Treatments 
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Figure 3. Overcharging over Time 
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Table 3. Predictions on Trade and Pricing-, Provision- and Charging-Policy 
(Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with Own-Money Maximizing Players) 
Note: n.d. stands for not determined in theoretical solution, but PL has to satisfy PL ≤ PH. 
 Interaction  Price Vector Provision Charging 
Baseline (B) 0%. n.d. always low overcharging 
 
Verifiability (V) 
 
100% 
 
(6, 10) 
always low if  PH - cH < PL - cL 
efficient prov. if  PH - cH = PL - cL 
always high if
 
 PH - cH > PL - cL 
 
honest charging 
Liability (L) 100% (n.d., 8) efficient provision overcharging 
